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On November 3, 2007 General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan declared a state of 
emergency. What ensued in the preceding weeks on the national front was a total
blockade of free speech, a complete reshuffling of Pakistani Supreme Court, and an
absolute clamp down on all political activities. His address to the nation started 
with the following instructive rationale:
As I speak to you today, Pakistan is facing a very dangerous situa-
tion. It is suffering from an internal crisis and whatever is happening 
now is related to the internal disturbance. During such moments for 
nations, a time comes when difficult decisions have to be taken. And 
if we do not take timely action, then God forbid it could be danger-
ous to Pakistan’s sovereignty.
In the same speech Mr. Musharraf named terrorism, rising extremism, paralysis of 
the government system caused by the Supreme Court interventions, and negative 
media coverage as  possible threats to the Pakistani sovereignty. He further went 
on to state that the law and order situation had deteriorated so drastically that the 
“extremists are roaming freely without let or hindrance in the country, and are not 
afraid of law enforcing agencies.” In any other circumstances, this break down of 
law and order could clearly been the responsibility of the ruling government, for 
the failure of law and order was also the failure of the government, especially a 
government with absolute powers of a military dictator. But surprisingly enough, 
while admitting that the country was in turmoil, Mr. Musharraf failed to take any 
blame for it himself but attempted to apportion blame to the terrorists themselves 
and the judiciary and the free media, as if simply by performing their task of report-
ing and dispensing justice these the judiciary and the media had become the sole 
cause of the destabilization of Pakistan. Needless to say, in the very same speech—
according to which Pakistan had reached a disastrous situation—Mr. Musharraf 
represented himself as the only true hope for Pakistan. Nowhere in his speech was 
there a reference to the failure of his own policies and the ramifications of his deep 
embrace with the United States in the “War against Terror” that might have brought 
Pakistan to the state of emergency. Let us remind ourselves that until September 
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11 2001, Mr. Musharraf was a completely isolated dictator who had seized power 
from an elected government and then cobbled together a government of political 
turncoats drawn from all segments of Pakistan’s political spectrum. 
 His base, if that it may be called, was the military and the Muttahidda Qau-
mi Movement (MQM) in Karachi, an organization that the Pakistan army (until re-
cently) considered a terrorist group notorious in the mid-eighties for murder, rape, 
and extortion in Karachi and Hyderabad, the two major southern cities of Pakistan 
. Surprisingly, while the general detailed the rise of fanaticism and troubles for 
Pakistan as a basis for declaring emergency, he did not even hazard an opinion as 
to why suddenly Pakistan had become such a dangerous place. It seemed as if this 
internal threat to Pakistan rose outside of history and could not find any explicatory 
narrative within the ten years of the general’s own rule and the general’s attempts 
at seeking much needed national and international legitimation . 
 In my opinion, most of the current problems of Pakistan stem from the very 
nature of Pakistan’s involvement in the “War on Terror” mandate that the general 
accepted in order to legitimate his government in the eyes of the west in general and 
the United States in particular. September eleven suddenly made the general into 
the most sought after ally in the region due to immediate US interest in Afghani-
stan. It was his decision to support the US war effort uncritically in Afghanistan 
that set Pakistan for the current situation, for while the “War on Terror” policies are 
safe for the US, as most of these wars are not being fought on the US territories, an 
uncritical acquiesceence to the US mandate was bound to create a tension within 
Pakistan. The situation was further complicated by the history of pre-September 
eleven engagement between the Pakistani government and the Taliban. General 
Pervez Mushraraf, especially, was deeply connected to the Taliban mujahideen who 
he used as a proxy in his misadventure into the Kargil offensive in the Northern 
Areas of Pakistan, a military adventure, carried out without the approval of elected 
Pakistani government, that almost led India and Pakistan to an all out war in 1998. 
Certainly, then, when the general did an about turn to accommodate the US against 
the Taliban, for the Taliban, who had died fighting in the general’s war, this about 
turn was not just political but also deeply personal. But buying into the US tactics 
of “War on Terror” has even further aggravated the situation. 
 Generally speaking the Afghan situation and the allied offensive against the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda followed a certain tactical pattern: the US ground forces 
basically acted as, for lack of a better word, “strike calling groups” that moved 
into the Taliban territory and then tried to eliminate Taliban positions by carefully 
directing air strikes at the likely targets. From the US point of view these tactics 
made sense, for it reduced the chances of US causalities while ensuring maximum 
punishment for the likely targets from a safe distance. No doubt that in this process 
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of lethal air strikes, the US forces could, and did, term any civilian deaths, if the 
question ever arose, as necessary collateral damage. But emulating the same strike 
and kill strategy within the borders of Pakistan by its own national army takes a 
completely different shape in the popular Pakistani perception.
 For the people of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), these incur-
sions into the tribal territories are seen as an extension of US policy into the tribal 
heartlands by the Pakistan army. Thus, by extension, the Pakistani government and 
the Pakistan army in the tribal consciousness become conflated with the so-called 
infidel western powers. While the Taliban may not be able to launch any direct at-
tacks against the mainland United States, they, in order to legitimate themselves as 
a resistance group, go for the easily available targets in the region, Pakistan itself. 
Hence, Pakistan in the popular imagination of the tribes and their Taliban counter-
parts is no longer a Muslim country that they may not have otherwise attacked but 
part of a global infidel conspiracy against their version of the shari’ah and Islam. 
The increasing Taliban attacks inside Pakistan are a direct result of the “War on 
Terror” that the Pakistan government waged during Musharraf years, often against 
its national interest and often for legitimating Mr. Musharraf’s unconstitutional rule 
in the eyes of the western and the US policy makers . The US certainly is the main 
exponent of current neoliberal regime of economics . Under this economic model, 
the government cannot legitimate itself through its social welfare functions as most 
of those functions have been privatized. The chief mode of legitimation for the US 
then becomes the security of its citizens . Under this operatic regime, the “War on 
Terror” serves as a constant tool of legitimation for the US government while the 
citizens are left to cope with the market forces at their own. Since the war itself is 
being fought elsewhere on other territories the immediate effects of the war do not 
concern average US citizens. However, the modes of legitimation in the other parts 
of the world, especially Pakistan, are still linked with the good works performed 
by the government. In a sense people still expect their government to run a welfare 
state in the traditional sense of the term. In fact in the words of one Pakistani jour-
nalist:
This [the neoliberal economic model] brings us to the role and re-
sponsibility of the state: should it outsource most of its functions 
and let citizens sink or swim? Or should it play an active role in 
ensuring that nobody should go hungry; that all children are enrolled 
in schools where they receive a decent education, whether they can 
pay or not; and that everybody has access to adequate health care.
Mr. Musharraf, however, having quickly moved into the neo-liberal economic poli-
cies, was also attempting to use public security as mode of legitimation, a fact 
painfully clear in his speech. But to most of the people of Pakistan this perpetual 
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war is inextricably linked with the US interest in the region and hence the idea of a 
security state no longer works as a legitimating strategy for Mr. Musharraf.
 Also, most Al-Qaeda and Taliban supported groups in Pakistan are from 
the extreme Wahabi factions. Their actions are underwritten by a strict interpreta-
tion of the rules of Shariah and the concept of Takfeer, or the state of infidelness. 
Takfeer was first juridcally discussed by Imam Ibn Taymiyyah. Accordingly, after 
Ibn Taymiyyah , it became possible to rationalize one Muslim power’s war against 
the other Muslims if the condition of Takfeer—Muslims living in a state if infidel-
ness—could be proved. By far Ibn Saud—the founder of Saudi dynasty—and his 
religious guide Muhammad ibn Abdulwahab , used this concept most effectively, 
and arbitrarily, to fight the other Muslim groups of the Arabian peninsula until the 
Saud family was completely in control of the Najd and later what they named as 
Saudi Arabia. The Taliban and their Alqaeda allies follow the same strict Wahabi 
interpretation of the Shariah. For them, to declare a Pakistani leader and institution 
in the state of Takfeer requires only, at this time, to be connected directly to US 
interests, especially the US “War on Terror” and its ensuing operations in Afghani-
stan. Hence, as long as Mr. Pervez Musharraf continued his policy of fighting the 
US proxy war on his own soil, the number of Taliban and Alqaeda volunteers con-
tinued to grow. A sad example of this escalation can be clearly traced to the tragic 
assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto wasn’t killed because she was a woman; 
she was killed because she was seen as an extension of US interest in the region. 
Her case wasn’t really helped when the US press represented her as a strong US ally 
and suggested that she had gone back to Pakistan under a deal brokered by the Unit-
ed States. Certainly, something must have changed in Pakistan that she returned to 
during her earlier two terms as Prime Minister, there were no known attempts by 
her opponents to assassinate her. What has changed drastically in Pakistan is its 
political climate, where the wars being fought in the NWFP and Baluchistan have 
now started spilling into the main urban areas of Pakistan. Sadly, Benazir Bhutto 
was a casualty of this particular escalation and her death warrant was written long 
before she stepped foot on the Pakistani soil. The main tragedy of her death is that 
at the very moment when she had decided to become a true leader by openly defy-
ing the Washington mandate to support Mr. Musharraf, she was killed. In this whole 
scenario the most important thing to remember is not as to which particular leader 
is pro or con US, but rather how does a particular leader maintain the illusion of 
Pakistani soveregnity. In the era of global capitalism this national sovereignty is 
nothing but an illusion, but such illusions serve an important function of legitimiz-
ing the national governments of particular nation-states. Every time the Pakistani 
leadership emulates the US tactics of “War on Terror”, the illusion is erased and the 
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people come to see their leaders as puppets of their US and European masters. In 
case of Mr. Musharraf this public perception of him had become almost axiomatic.
 On the whole the newly imposed emergency wasn’t much different from 
the arbitrary system of power that the general had employed until then, but it finally 
lifted the veil of carefully crated hegemonic power structure and brought the brute 
force of general’s dictatorship clearly to his national and international audience, 
especially his US allies. This time was also extremely crucial for the future of US 
perception in Pakistan. The Pakistanis have never really believed the often loud 
declarations in favor of democracy that are issued from various media and political 
pulpits of the US, but the declaration of emergency became the absolute testing mo-
ment of the US commitment to democracy. It would be apt to suggest that in those 
few days the constant US rhetoric about the importance of democracy suddenly 
found itself under the limelight and was displayed in its nakedness as nothing but 
rhetoric. The US response was quite instructive, for it made it clear once and for 
all for the people of Pakistan that when it came time for the US to choose between 
an alliance with a military dictator and the possibility of a democratic Pakistan, the 
US chose the convenience of backing their favorite dictator, and this is the image 
of the United States that has now been reported, represented, and perceived by the 
Pakistani public. As a result any legitimate government, automatically, will have to 
put some distance between itself and the US war agenda in the region, which seems 
to be the only sane approach to stabilizing Pakistan and making it safe in the long 
run.
Notes:
1 The text of the speech is available at http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/Pres-
identialSpeeches.aspx. Visited on January 9, 2008.
2 In 1986 MQM was considered a terrorist organization. The author was in Karachi
during that year and as an army officer was part of the regular curfew deployments 
to check the sectarian clashes between the Muhajirs and non-Muhajirs in the city. 
During that time the MQM was officially considered a terrorist organization.
3 I am not suggesting here that Pakistan should not fight actively against the threat 
of terrorism, but my point is that Pakistan’s contribution to the War on Terror needs 
to be guided by Pakistan’s own immediate national interest and should in no way 
be solely driven by the US national interest. 
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4 For a good discussion of neoliberal economics see John Rapley, Globalization 
and Inequality, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).
5 Zygmunt Bauman provides a brilliant discussion of this particular aspect of neo-
liberal’s rteliance on security as legitimating tool for the state. For details see his 
Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (New York: Polity, 2004).
6 Irfan Husain. “Give us back Our Country.” (Daily Dawn, Nov 24, 2007). Avail-
able at http://dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/20071124.htm.
7 For a detailed study of Ibn Tamiyyah’s times and major works see his Al-Jaw-
ab Al-Sahih translated by Thomas F. Michel, A Muslim Theologian’s response to 
Christianity, (New York: Caravan Books, 1984.)
8 Details of Wahab-Saud alliance are available in As’ad Abukhal’s The Battle for 
Saudi Arabia, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004.)
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